On March 14th, 1988, China used force to occupy the Johnson Reef of Vietnam. China’s navy used heavy arms to massacre underequipped Vietnamese sailors. Such brutal acts were strongly condemned by international community. However, China seemingly has not drawn any lessons from the Johnson Reef event, as they continue to use force to carry out its conspiracy to turn the whole South East Asia Sea into its home pond.
Please watch the clip: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Go-AuI8LzIo
China set a precedent for armed conflict in the South China Sea during two encounters with Vietnamese forces, in 1974 and 1988. In both incidents, China used force to stake its claim to territory far beyond its shores. As tensions increase in the region, it’s worth examining those incidents to understand the historical context of conflict in the region.
Over the past two years there have been several events relating to territorial and maritime rights in the South China Sea: scientists planting a Chinese flag on the seabed floor by a submersible vessel, fishing disagreements between China and Vietnam, and the current China and Philippine dispute over Scarborough Shoal, less than 200 nautical miles from Manila. The recent conflict began in April over a fishing disagreement between China and the Philippines causing diplomatic tensions over territorial rights and resulting in more than 15 ships near Scarborough Shoal. Collectively, these incidents indicate the complexity of the Asia-Pacific region, which is now a focal point of the new national security strategy.
As U.S. policy-makers contemplate this challenge of competing territorial and maritime rights in the South China Sea, there are important lessons from the last time violence flared in the region. During the 1970s and 1980s, China collided with Vietnam over territorial rights in the South China Sea. China occupied several islands and reefs resulting in more than 100 deaths and several Vietnam ships being either sunk or damaged beyond repair.
The Paracel Islands, a chain of small islands approximately 375 nautical miles south of Hong Kong, are separated into two groups: Amphitrite (Xuande) and Crescent (Yongle). In 1970, China began to focus more on the Paracel Islands with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducting survey operations to include gathering meteorological, geological, and topographical data starting from the Amphitrite transiting towards the Crescent group. In 1971, China developed a military infrastructure within the Amphitrite Group to include a concrete pier and dredged harbor at Woody Island in support of PLAN warships. The same year Vietnam allowed foreign companies to search for oil in the South China Sea and by 1973 Vietnam awarded eight offshore exploration contracts.
In November 1973, a Republic of Vietnam patrol ship rammed a Chinese fishing vessel and the crew was detained in Vietnam for interrogation. In January 1974 as the conflict progressed, the Chinese Foreign Ministry for the first time “linked territorial claims to offshore islands with maritime rights” and emphasized the importance that China owned the natural resources in the area. On Jan 15, the conflict escalated when RVN forces fired on two Chinese fishing vessels that entered the Crescent Group.
Four days later, China assembled six naval ships within the Crescent Group to confront the four RVN ships in the area. The conflict turned violent resulting in 36 deaths, 110 wounded, and more than 160 missing between China and Vietnam military personnel. Following the incident, China consolidated the two island groups and made the Paracel Islands a top priority for further military construction.
China’s Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping had a significant role in China’s maritime development and modernization after the Paracel Islands incident, especially during the 1980s. In 1982, Deng appointed Admiral Liu Huaqing, a close friend, to lead the PLAN. Liu emphasized the navy’s key mission was to establish a presence in the Spratly Islands, approximately 750 nautical miles south of Hong Kong. Admiral Liu ordered the first combat patrol of the South China Sea conducted by South Sea Fleet in April 1987. Survey operations were also conducted in the southern portion of the Spratly Islands dating to 1983. The surveys indicated Fiery Cross reef, approximately 260 nautical miles from Vietnam, would serve as the best location for a permanent oceanic observation station.
The PLAN’s operational design for this region was twofold: establishing territorial rights in the South China Sea and expanding naval power projection capability from “near-coastal defense” to “near-seas active defense”. The near coastal area is defined within 12 nautical miles or so to China’s mainland, and near seas are the seas within the first island chain as well as encompassing the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas.
In November 1987 the PLAN received approval from the Central Military Commission (CMC) and State Council to occupy a total of nine reefs in the Spratly Islands. By mid-January 1988, the PLAN occupied Fiery Cross reef with several PLAN ships taking station in the area.
In a race to occupy territory in the Spratly Islands, Vietnam and China began a reef hopping campaign. From January to March 1988, both navies encountered each other near various reefs without violence. However, on March 14, this uneasy peace was broken when both nations’ forces were apparently directed to evict the other at Johnson (Chigua) Reef — east of Fiery Cross reef. After deploying more than 100 troops combined between China and Vietnam at Johnson reef, shoving occurred and shots were fired. Within 30 minutes, the PLAN routed the Vietnamese, sinking or destroying three ships and killing seventy-four sailors. After the incident, Deng Xiaoping (now the Central Military Commission Chairman) offered his congratulations to the PLAN units for their decisive victory.
These two obscure incidents teach two important lessons. First, China has set a precedent for the use of force to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In retrospect, almost ten years ago China and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force” (ASEAN Document). Thus, will China uphold this agreement or use force to resolve territorial disputes?
Second, the Sino-Vietnam relationship is a critical indicator about the future of the South China Sea. Closely monitoring China’s actions towards Vietnam could serve as a bellwether of a potential policy change led by the Chinese government or PLAN. Given China’s increase in overall maritime capability relative to other regional navies over the last 30 years, this rising nation may feel further empowered to act militarily in response to today’s territorial disputes and the potential for miscalculation is real.
For the foreseeable future, the South China Sea will be both a hot-spot and continuous challenge for the region, the international community, and the United States. The 1974 and 1988 incidents show that China is willing to use force to achieve military and political objectives. As the Scarborough Shoal conflict continues between China and the Philippines, understanding this historical context may also prove useful as we work arduously to avoid a future violent confrontation on the high seas.
For the second time since the John South Reef – Gac Ma skirmish over twenty five years ago, the largest daily newspapers in Vietnam have written special columns commemorating sixty-four martyrs sacrificed to defend their homeland’s sovereignty at the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
Vietnam and China have been known as neighbors and brothers like “lips and teeth”. However, bearing the same pressure as other China’s “unhappy neighbors”, Vietnam had to fight against its big brother China to protect its sovereignty. The skirmish on March 14th, 1988 at John South Reef – Gac Ma (Spratly Islands) is a recent Sino-Vietnamese naval confrontation. The site lies at 4 nautical miles (nm) to the northwest of Vietnamese-controlled Collins Reef. Chinese gunboats sank and damaged three Vietnamese vessels. Sixty-four Vietnamese soldiers were killed and many others injured, while one Chinese was wounded.
Despite many conflicts in the past, Hanoi and Peking always maintain their “16 golden words and four cardinal principles”, for example regarding the bilateral consensus to actively guide public opinion on the South China Sea disputes, a ‘sensible’ subject to Vietnamese government-controlled media (aka. “right side” media, in comparison to the free “left side” one) for long time. But the anti-China sentiment in public has been on the rise since the cable-seized incident of Vietnamese ships on May 2011.
In the past two recent years, there have been remarkable improvements of media in Vietnam on the South China Sea issues, especially with the development of new media with blogs, forum or the social networks where everyone may express and share easily their opinions to the world.
However, the John South Reef skirmish is a poorly titled subject in Vietnamese “right side” media. On May 7th, 2012, the Vietnamese government organized for the first time a commemoration day for sixty-four martyrs sacrificed in navel battle at John South Reef. This year, Tuoi Tre, one of largest “right wing” newspapers, focuses on the topic with a series of touching stories about killed soldiers, live witness and remains of the battle that create actually a tacit movement that heats up the anti-China sentiment in the Vietnamese communities and social networks.
It’s also important to mention that the Sino-Vietnamese naval battle on January 19th, 1974 at Paracels Islands was officially commemorated for the first time last January 19th 2013 by Thanh Nien News, another government-controlled daily newspaper.
Both Vietnam and China have declared the historical sovereignty in the South China Sea (including Spratly Islands and Paracels Islands) where five other countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan) also claimed their territory or territory rights.
Battle image
The transport ship HQ-603 was taken photo on March 10, 1988 — four days before it was sunk at Gac Ma Atoll in TruongSa archipelago
The Vietnamese soldiers’ extraordinary gallantry and dogged determination to safeguard the nation’s territory was defeated by Chinese state-of-the-art weaponry and ruthlessness. Since then Gac Ma Island has been illigimately occupied by China.
The immediate cause
In response to the imminent, illegitimate occupation of Truong Sa by the Chinese invaders, prior to March 14, 1988, the Vietnamese transport ships HQ-505, HQ-604 and HQ-605, under the command of the 125 and 146 Brigades and the E83 Military Engineering Regiment, were immediately sent to the atolls of Co Lin, Len Dao and Gac Ma, where they built fortifications and other infrastructure during the CQ88 campaign, which was a relentless attempt to maintain Vietnamese ownership of Truong Sa.
The imbalanced, bloodstained battle
25 years have passed since the fight, yet that morning has been firmly imprinted in the mind of Nguyen Van Lanh, a naval soldier who took part in the battle.
Late in the evening of March 13, HQ-604 arrived at Gac Ma, while the other two ships headed for Co Lin and Len Dao, Lanh recalled. It is believed this is a ship that looks exactly like HQ-604. The group led by Second Lieutenant Tran Van Phuong was in charge of pitching and safeguarding the Vietnamese national flag on the island. Nearby, the Vietnamese flag was also flying on Co Lin island. Lieutenant-colonel Tran Duc Thong commanded that the soldiers focused on the task despite the Chinese warships lurking in the vicinity. At dawn on March 14, Chinese ships closed in on HQ-604. These ships were fully equipped with advanced firepower and lethal weaponry, whereas the Vietnamese vessels were merely designed to carry soldiers, food and construction materials. The majority of the Vietnamese soldiers were sappers who specialized in carrying out construction work on the islands. Despite the serious imbalance in power, the Vietnamese captains and soldiers unwaveringly resolved to safeguard the islands. At around 6 a.m, the Chinese force sent small boats filled with armed-to-the-teeth soldiers to close in on the Gac Ma corals. To counter this, on Gac Ma, the Vietnamese soldiers formed a circle, which was later respectfully named ‘the immortal circle’, in an unwavering attempt to guard the Vietnamese flag in the center. As there were few Vietnamese naval soldiers on the island, Lanh and all the other sappers, armed with merely hoes and shovels, were immediately summoned to aid Phuong’s regular group. The battle became heated in an instant. The Chinese troops landed in large numbers and tried to break the circle, but failed.
After a firefight the Chinese troops were able to approach Second Lieutenant Phuong, who was holding onto the flag for dear life.
Phuong and Lanh struggled with all their might to keep the flag until Phuong was suddenly shot in the head. He collapsed, but still tried to hold onto the bloody flag.
Lanh managed to keep the flag until Chinese soldiers stabbed him from behind and finally shot him with an AK-47.
The battle continued to rage. The Chinese ships fired heavy machine guns and 37 mm cannons at the unyielding Vietnamese soldiers.
The fight was also ferocious aboard the HQ-604 ship, which was incessantly bombarded with long-range fire power, Mai Van Hai, one of the survivors, recalled. B-40 and B-41 on the Vietnamese ship couldn’t reach the enemy.
Right after the battle began, Captain Vu Phi Tru dashed into the engine room, planning to land the ship on the Gac Ma corals. All of a sudden, the engine room was hit and burst into flames, engulfing Tru, leaving the ship unable to land, Hai added.
Hai then tried to see Lieutenant-colonel Tran Duc Thong and Captain Phong right as they were fired upon with heavy machine guns.
Thong and Phong both perished, and the HQ- 604 ship gradually sank into the sea, taking down with it dozens of soldiers.
“A normal transportation vessel, the HQ-604 could only fire from 500 meters at most, while it was roughly 3.6-5.4 km away from the enemy ships. They were perhaps trying to steer the ship nearer to the Chinese ones to get into firing range, but it couldn’t withstand the enemy barrage,” colonel Tran Thanh Tam explained, 25 years later.
Immediately after finishing off HQ-604 off Gac Ma, the Chinese warships turned to bombard HQ-605 with heavy weaponry. The ship burst into intense flames, and Captain Son of HQ-605 ordered everyone on board to evacuate.
Plastic sandals, bowls, clothes, and weapons found in the HQ-604 in 2008 (Photo: Tuoi Tre)
Immediately after finishing off HQ-604, one of the three Vietnamese ships sent to fortify Truong Sa, off Gac Ma, the Chinese battleships turned to bombard HQ-605, one of the two remaining ships, which was guarding Len Dao island, with heavy weaponry.
The ship burst into intense flames, and Captain Le Lenh Son ordered everyone on board to promptly evacuate.
“If we had stayed on board, we would all have been killed, while the nation’s ownership remained at stake. I allowed everyone to jump into the sea, with the conviction that each soldier would later become a living witness and an unwavering flesh-and-blood flag in the quest to maintain Vietnam’s ownership of Truong Sa,”explained Captain Son, 25 years after the fight.
However, the soldiers stayed put in Len Dao waters, defying the incessant shower of heavy fire, until the Chinese warships returned to Gac Ma, Hoang Van Nam, a survivor, tearfully recalled.
After the enemy vessels left Len Dao, the soldiers from HQ-605 headed for Sinh Ton (Survival) island.
Nam then found Doan, HQ-605’s mate (a deck officer of a rank below the master of the ship). Though he was suffering from critical burns on his whole body, Doan remained strangely conscious and kept staring at the Vietnamese national flag pitched on Co Lin island, muttering indistinctly as if to remind his comrades to carry out their duty at any cost.
By midday, 17 soldiers, both deceased and injured, had been found. Some bodies couldn’t be recovered, Nam added.
Captain Son ordered the few unharmed soldiers to row a rescue boat with their hands to Sinh Ton island. As they approached the island around 3 p.m, mate Doan breathed his last breath.
The situation on Gac Ma island was also highly tense. After HQ-604 was sunk, the Chinese ships stopped firing but lingered in the Vietnam-owned waters.
Bodies of soldiers from the ship were drifting in the bloodstained sea water.
Colonel Vu Huy Le, former captain of HQ-505, decided to send his ship running aground on Co Lin island to turn it an unsinkable fortification for his suicidal mission of defending Co Lin
Earlier, HQ-505, the other Vietnamese ship, had beached on Co Lin atoll, with the ship’s stern seriously burned. The ship’s intrepid soldiers turned into an unsinkable fortification, with the Vietnamese national flag flapping vigorously on the atoll.
Twenty-five years later, Captain Vu Huy Le recalled in tears that after HQ-505 arrive on Co Lin, he split his soldiers into two groups, one that remained on board, ready to fight back, and one that was sent to rescue sailors from the sunk HQ-604 off Gac Ma.
This was an extremely daunting, dangerous task, as the enemy threatened to shoot even unarmed soldiers providing rescue and medical relief. Yet they were resolved to come to their injured comrades’ aid, Le further recalled.
Lieutenant-colonel Pham Van Hung, of HQ-505, who was in the rescue team, remembered that they had to hold back tears at the horrifying sight on Gac Ma.
An aerial photograph shows the HQ-505 running aground to beach on Co Lin atoll, with the ship’s stern seriously burned. White smoke rises up from behind. Soldiers used the ship as an unsinkable fortification and successfully defended the island (Photo: Tuoi Tre)
Loyal to the cause
The surviving soldiers were determined to safeguard the national ownership of Truong Sa.
After taking the deceased and injured to Sinh Ton island, Captain Le of HQ-505 reported to the commanding headquarters that they had managed to defend the national flag, ship and force. They insisted on staying in order to fulfill the task and were willing to fight to the death on this nearly suicidal mission.
The commanding headquarters agreed to the request.
An urgent meeting was summoned that night, during which Captain Le selected nine among many volunteers to stay with him.
The team was well aware of the dangers awaiting them, as their ship was nothing more than an immobile, metal hunk on Co Lin.
“I’ve dreamt of this moving sight again and again. The young soldiers cried at not being selected to stay,” said captain and political commissar Vo Ta Du, who also remembered promising to recount the entire battle with tales of the soldiers’ great heroism.
The team, led by Captain Le, was then split into five smaller groups, ready to sacrifice their own lives to defend Truong Sa.
POW Trần Thiện Phụng and his wife reading his old letters from prison
Mr. Văn Hiền
In the realm of geopolitical disputes, the barren Paracel Islands are a far cry from the mountains of Kashmir or the alleys of Gaza. Claimed by both China and Vietnam, the archipelago comprises some 30 tiny spits of land in the middle of the South China Sea with innocuous names like Woody Island and Antelope Reef. No one lives there, nor has there been any evidence that lucrative natural resources lie beneath its lagoons and reefs. But, experts say, at a time when regional economies are booming — and nationalist sentiments swelling — the Paracels and the heavily contested Spratly islands further south remain a flashpoint in this part of the world, where the traditional balance of power is tilting further toward China.
Tensions flared most recently years when the Chinese government announced it would begin developing high-end tourism on a few of the Paracels as part of an ambitious new plan to draw tourists from around the world to Hainan, a Chinese island province off the mainland’s southern coast. But while planners dream of creating a Chinese Hawaii — with the Paracels’ clear waters a potential luxury destination for divers — the leaked proposal made Hanoi bristle almost instantly. China has retained de facto control over the archipelago since seizing it in its entirety with gunboats in 1974, but Vietnam has stubbornly clung to its long-standing territorial claims over the archipelago.
The spat may be a minor compared to incidents in the past — the two countries fought a bloody border war in 1979, and in 1988 a naval battle near the Spratlys left 70 Vietnamese sailors dead. But it comes amid a steady buildup of Chinese might in the region. Ralf Emmers, an expert on the South China Sea and associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, says the Chinese tourism gambit is a move “to make its sovereignty claims over these islands a fait accompli.” Vietnam watchers point to an escalation of tensions since the 2007 completion of a strategic Chinese submarine base on Hainan Island, just over 124 miles (200 km) from Vietnam’s eastern shore. The base has enabled Beijing to project its power not only in its own backyard, but further into the Pacific and Indian oceans as well.
Open conflict, of course, is unlikely given the scale of economic integration in Southeast Asia. Sino-Vietnamese relations in most arenas are as robust as they’ve ever been. But observers are concerned that governments have yet to come up with an effective way to arbitrate this maritime dispute. In 2002, China signed a code of conduct with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Vietnam is a member, pledging to refrain from activities that would destabilize the fragile status quo in the South China Sea. Few parties have kept to the spirit of the agreement. The Spratlys, an island chain far larger than the Paracels, are claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and nominally by Taiwan, and resemble a Risk game board with territories grabbed pell-mell over the years in a scramble for land and influence. Malaysia has set up a diving resort on one of its own reefs, while most other nations have military posts on their islands. “The ASEAN model has been more or less useless,” says Simon Shen, a professor of international relations at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “The official discourse is [for claimant nations] to co-develop [the islands], but this is almost impossible given the nationalism the dispute inspires.”
In China and Vietnam, in particular, nationalist netizens have pressured their governments to remain firm on issues of sovereignty. Both sides have dredged up archival evidence supposedly linking these clusters of uninhabited rocks in the sea to the glories of ancient dynasties and Emperors.
Walking such a precarious tightrope means Hanoi — as well as other governments claiming the Spratlys and the Paracels — have to measure their actions carefully. “The real risk in the South China Sea,” says Emmers, “is that of a miscalculation that could lead to skirmishes and a clash of arms.” As signs of meaningful cooperation are few, most expect this tacit consolidation of interests — including China’s economic expansion into the Paracels — to continue. How this chess game plays out may have broader ramifications as the Chinese military extends its clout and influence in the coming decades. “It’s an interesting showcase for what the future of Chinese naval power may look like,” says Emmers. “And not just in the South China Sea.”
When the Chinese invaded Hoang Sa in 1974, the Republic of Vietnam fought with all they had. The attack ended in what is arguably a stalemate. However, since the losses of the People’s Republic of China nearly doubled that of the Republic of Vietnam, it is fair to argue that the battle was won by the South Vietnamese Navy. The South did win the battle, but they would end up losing the islands in the end. Since they used up all of their resources on the first confrontation, the Republic of Vietnam did not have enough firepower for a second. For this reason, the Chinese would return on the following day with more naval power, and complete their invasion of the Paracel Islands (Hoang Sa).
Fast forward to 1988, where a group of unarmed Vietnamese soldiers, who put up their guns to become workers on the islands of Truong Sa, were ambushed by several Chinese warships. With no fighting capabilities, the Vietnamese workers were massacred by the invading army of the PRC. This attack would be known as the “Massacre on the Spratly Islands,” where a Chinese army ruthlessly slaughtered a group of unarmed Vietnamese workers. To this day, China denies these allegations, even though the proof of their crimes are well documented in books and all over the internet.
They justified the massacre by claiming that they were defending themselves against aggressive Vietnamese soldiers. How could this be? Vietnam did not have a warship present, they didn’t even have any artillery to fight back with. Regardless, China keeps persisting that they were defending themselves, unwilling to acknowledge the damning evidence of their wrongdoings. It should be interesting to note that the Chinese used the very same excuses to invade Hoang Sa in 1794, so it shouldn’t be that surprising to see them use it again. It was this attack that made Spratly fall into the hands of the Chinese, along with Hoang Sa.
It was always on China’s agenda to take both of the islands, since they had the idea of controlling all of the Southeast Asia Sea for the longest time. The big difference between the incidents in 1974 and 1988 is that the event in 1974 was a military clash, while 1988 is just a ruthless massacre of defenseless individuals. The attack in 1974 was wrong enough, invading a piece of land that is clearly not under China’s jurisdiction. However, the assault in 1988 was even worse. This time, the victims didn’t even have anything to protect themselves with! Both of the invasions were disgraceful, the latter was the most. To this day, China is still in control of Hoang Sa, while also trying to take full control of Truong Sa. It is true that the situation is bleak right now, but don’t worry. In time, when the right leader arrives, we will take it all back. With interest.
On Mar 14, 1988 a fierce sea battle took place between Vietnamese soldiers and Chinese troops around Co Lin, Len Dao and Gac Ma, which are part of the Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelago.
However, few people know the details of this battle.
The Vietnamese soldiers’ extraordinary gallantry and dogged determination to safeguard the nation’s territory was defeated by Chinese state-of-the-art weaponry and ruthlessness. Since then Gac Ma Island has been illigimately occupied by China.
The immediate cause
In response to the imminent, illegitimate occupation of Truong Sa by the Chinese invaders, prior to March 14, 1988, the Vietnamese transport ships HQ-505, HQ-604 and HQ-605, under the command of the 125 and 146 Brigades and the E83 Military Engineering Regiment, were immediately sent to the atolls of Co Lin, Len Dao and Gac Ma, where they built fortifications and other infrastructure during the CQ88 campaign, which was a relentless attempt to maintain Vietnamese ownership of Truong Sa.
The imbalanced, bloodstained battle
25 years have passed since the fight, yet that morning has been firmly imprinted in the mind of Nguyen Van Lanh, a naval soldier who took part in the battle.
Late in the evening of March 13, HQ-604 arrived at Gac Ma, while the other two ships headed for Co Lin and Len Dao, Lanh recalled.
The group led by Second Lieutenant Tran Van Phuong was in charge of pitching and safeguarding the Vietnamese national flag on the island.
Nearby, the Vietnamese flag was also flying on Co Lin island.
Lieutenant-colonel Tran Duc Thong commanded that the soldiers focus on the task despite the Chinese warships lurking in the vicinity.
At dawn on March 14, Chinese ships closed in on HQ-604. These ships were fully equipped with advanced firepower and lethal weaponry, whereas the Vietnamese vessels were merely designed to carry soldiers, food and construction materials.
The majority of the Vietnamese soldiers were sappers who specialized in carrying out construction work on the islands.
Despite the serious imbalance in power, the Vietnamese captains and soldiers unwaveringly resolved to safeguard the islands.
At around 6 am, the Chinese force sent small boats filled with armed-to-the-teeth soldiers to close in on the Gac Ma corals.
To counter this, on Gac Ma, the Vietnamese soldiers formed a circle, which was later respectfully named ‘the immortal circle’, in an unwavering attempt to guard the Vietnamese flag in the center.
As there were few Vietnamese naval soldiers on the island, Lanh and all the other sappers, armed with merely hoes and shovels, were immediately summoned to aid Phuong’s regular group.
The battle became heated in an instant. The Chinese troops landed in large numbers and tried to break the circle, but failed.
After a firefight the Chinese troops were able to approach Second Lieutenant Phuong, who was holding onto the flag for dear life.
Phuong and Lanh struggled with all their might to keep the flag until Phuong was suddenly shot in the head. He collapsed, but still tried to hold onto the bloody flag.
Lanh managed to keep the flag until Chinese soldiers stabbed him from behind and finally shot him with an AK-47.
The battle continued to rage. The Chinese ships fired heavy machine guns and 37 mm cannons at the unyielding Vietnamese soldiers.
The fight was also ferocious aboard the HQ-604 ship, which was incessantly bombarded with long-range fire power, Mai Van Hai, one of the survivors, recalled. B-40 and B-41 on the Vietnamese ship couldn’t reach the enemy.
Right after the battle began, Captain Vu Phi Tru dashed into the engine room, planning to land the ship on the Gac Ma corals. All of a sudden, the engine room was hit and burst into flames, engulfing Tru, leaving the ship unable to land, Hai added.
Hai then tried to see Lieutenant-colonel Tran Duc Thong and Captain Phong right as they were fired upon with heavy machine guns.
The Spratly Islands are a group of more than 750 reefs,islets, atolls, cays and islands in the Southeast Asia Sea. In 1998, those Chinese attacked, stole Vietnamese islands and killed their soldiers there.
Thong and Phong both perished, and the HQ- 604 ship gradually sank into the sea, taking down with it dozens of soldiers.
“A normal transportation vessel, the HQ-604 could only fire from 500 meters at most, while it was roughly 3.6-5.4 km away from the enemy ships. They were perhaps trying to steer the ship nearer to the Chinese ones to get into firing range, but it couldn’t withstand the enemy barrage,” colonel Tran Thanh Tam explained, 25 years later.
Immediately after finishing off HQ-604 off Gac Ma, the Chinese warships turned to bombard HQ-605 with heavy weaponry.
The ship burst into intense flames, and Captain Son of HQ-605 ordered everyone on board to evacuate.
The Johnson South Reef Skirmish of 1988 was a naval battle that took place between Chinese and Vietnamese forces over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands on March 14, 1988.
In early February 1988, the China Construction forces launched the construction of NO.74 ocean observatory on Fiery Cross Reef. To guarantee the security of the establishment of the station site from 18 January to 14 March 1988, the South China Sea Fleet entered the Spratly Islands.
Upon learning that China intended to build a marine observation station, the Vietnamese Navy began to intensify its occupation of the islands and reefs of Spratly Islands.
In the afternoon of February 18, 1988, the Chinese Navy and Vietnamese Navy rushed to land on Huayang reef at the same time, each planting a flag. Confrontation between the two sides ensued for 3 hours as a result, eventually with the Vietnamese Navy retreating due to inclement weather. However from January 15 to February 19, the 171 Fleet in Vietnam and 125 transport brigade sent armed men to occupy 5 reefs around the Fiery Cross Reef, and surrounded the waters around the reef.
At 6:00 on March 14, NO.604 carriers of the Vietnamese Navy laid down a wooden boat loaded with heavily armed Vietnamese soldiers and the materials used to build fortifications on the Johnson South Reef and planted two Vietnam flags on it.
At 7:50 Lee Chu, political commissar of China’s NO.502-ship, sailed boats to bypass the Vietnamese boat heading for the reefs along with seven soldiers. They removed the Vietnamese flag, and one hour later confrontation with the Vietnamese began, leading to a scuffle by Chinese and Vietnamese soldiers, with shots exchanged.
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